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Financing Economic Activity: Schumpeter vs Keynes 
Eric Nasica 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we compare Schumpeter’s and Keynes’ views on the financing of 
economic activity. As will be seen, both economists share common ideas about 
the working and financing of market economies. In particular, both Keynes and 
Schumpeter reject the classical notions of the neutrality of money and the 
dichotomy of the real and the monetary sector, emphasising instead the role of 
monetary and financial variables in their respective explanations of economic 
fluctuations (section 1). However, the two approaches also display significant 
differences, most notably with regard to the importance attributed to specific 
financial variables and institutions for the financing of economic activity. Section 
2 examines these differences and emphasises the originality of Schumpeter's 
analysis of banking.  
 
The rejection of classical monetary theory 
When comparing Schumpeter's and Keynes' monetary analyses one can hardly 
miss the considerable degree of similarities between the two approaches: Not only 
does the inclusion of money into their respective analytical frameworks produce 
similar insights in both cases. It is also at the root of a radical revision of the 
features of the economic system they examine. 
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In the preparatory drafts of the General Theory (Keynes: 1973a, 1973b, 1979), 
Keynes makes a distinction between a ‘co-operative’ (or real wage) economy and 
an ‘entrepreneurial’ (or money wage) economy.1 Schumpeter, too, draws a clear 
distinction between two situations: the circular flow and economic development.  
Keynes' co-operative economy and Schumpeter's circular flow have two key 
features in common. First, even if money exists in these specific states, as with 
classical theory it is simply regarded as a technical device for facilitating real 
exchange and is neutral with regard to the level of production. As Schumpeter 
points out, ‘money has, in the circular flow, no other role than that of facilitating 
the circulation of commodities’ (Schumpeter 1911: 53). Secondly, the co-
operative economy and the circular flow both describe what might be called a 
‘static’ economy. In the Schumpeterian circular flow there are neither 
entrepreneurs nor capitalists, credit or interest: All factors potentially influencing 
the process of economic development are excluded from the analysis. In Keynes' 
co-operative economy decisions about production and distribution are made 
jointly by all producers in such a way as to maximize utility and consumption for 
all individuals and, at the same time, for society at large (Keynes 1979: 66, 77). In 
this economy, income is paid in kind or out of the output produced by the 
workforce, and Say's law necessarily holds true. 
 
In both approaches, the departure from the static economy is made possible by 
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introducing a more complex concept of money. In Keynes’ analysis, this new type 
of money is a store of value; in Schumpeter’s theory it takes the form of credit. 
With this change in the nature of money, the economy becomes dynamic in that 
disequilibria (or underemployment equilibria) and fluctuations of economic 
activity are now possible. 
 
In Keynes' approach, macroeconomic instability and disequilibria are a 
consequence of new patterns of behaviour characteristic of the ‘entrepreneurial 
economy’, such as the long-run demand for liquidity. These types of behaviour are 
a feature of a money wage economy operating in an uncertain decision-making 
environment, in which Keynes was mainly interested. The mere existence of 
money as a store of value is likely to drive the economy towards a long-period 
equilibrium characterized by lasting unemployment. Indeed, the decision not to 
purchase goods (that is, to adopt an attitude of saving and waiting) does ‘not 
necessitate a decision to have dinner or to buy a pair of boots a week hence or to 
consume at any specified date (...). It is not a substitution of future consumption 
demand for current consumption demand - it is a net diminution of such demand’ 
(Keynes 1936: 218). 
 
In Schumpeter's approach, the dynamic aspects of economic activity, such as 
innovation and development, are closely linked to the creation of money in the 
form of credit. Schumpeter regards credit creation by banks as the main source of 
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finance, once the stationary economy of the circular flow is left behind and the 
analysis focuses on the process of economic development. More specifically, the 
meaning of credit in this context is that of ‘new means of payment created ad hoc 
since the entrepreneurs have no means of their own and since there are - so far - 
no savings’ (Schumpeter 1939: 111). These means of payment required by 
entrepreneurs in order to finance their innovations do not only include money as 
such. Schumpeter (1917) provides a full list of such means of payments, which 
includes ‘money made of a material the market price of which is less than the 
purchasing power of the monetary unit made of it’, ‘bank notes’ but also ‘current 
accounts and clearing accounts’, ‘the amount of all payments which are 
disbursements out of income and are handled exclusively by compensation’ and, 
finally, ‘credit instruments and claim titles of all kinds, to the extent that they in 
fact perform the role of money’. 
 
Money strictly defined, therefore, no longer plays the same role as in the circular 
flow: ‘Not only a part but the whole of the exchange process can be settled by ... 
credit media’ (Schumpeter 1911: 53). This also implies Schumpeter’s definition of 
the entrepreneur as the ‘typical debtor’ (Ibid: 101, 103). At first sight, this specific 
feature of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, together with the fact that Schumpeter 
considers the diversion of finance from routine to innovative activities to be the 
main role of credit, suggests a certain affinity between his analysis and the 
writings of the Banking School.2 However, on closer examination this 
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interpretation ceases to be convincing. Not only does Schumpeter accept the idea 
of a possible autonomous effect of the quantity of money on the general price 
level (Schumpeter, 1939: 546-547), suggesting that he would welcome a synthesis 
of the Banking and the Currency Schools. He has also made it clear himself in 
unambiguous terms that he does not regard his approach to be in complete accord 
with that embraced by the Banking School (Schumpeter 1917: 209). 
 
However, it would also be quite difficult to include Schumpeter among quantity 
theorists, given his explicit and persistent rejection of the quantity theory of 
money (Schumpeter 1954:1095-1117). A detailed analysis of Schumpeter’s main 
objections to the quantity theory of money has been provided by Graziani (1989) 
and Messori (1984) to which we refer the interested reader. In the present context 
it suffices to note a few main points: First, Schumpeter rejects any a-priori concept 
of the quantity of money as a causal influence on prices.3 Secondly, he argues that, 
because of the existence of substitutes, and of credit and reserves in particular, a 
precise definition of the quantity of money is quite impossible4, and that it has 
been equally impossible to provide a homogenous concept of the quanitity of 
money or a unique notion of the velocity of circulation (Schumpeter 1917: 28). 
Furthermore, money, not being a commodity, has no proper value (Schumpeter 
1990: XX) and ‘the traditional apparatus of supply and demand [can] not be 
applied to the solution of the problem of money prices of commodities and of 
price levels’ (Schumpeter 1939: 547). Schumpeter emphasizes that the ‘reflected 
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value’ of money is rarely proportionate to the quantity of money because 
variations in the latter often imply variations in relative prices and redistribution 
effects5. Finally, credit money supplied by banks depends crucially on 
entrepreneurial demand: Without the entrepreneur there is no credit creation, and 
the effective volume of credit supplied changes according to shifts in demand. 
 
Schumpeter also mentions the possibility of a twofold origin of finance. If the 
demand of enterprises for means of payment is not fully met, entrepreneurs may 
take recourse to accumulated non-banking savings, either through self-financing 
(by using profits accumulated in an earlier phase of economic development) or 
through the money market (Schumpeter 1911: 199). 
 
In essence then, Schumpeter regards money supply not as an independent variable, 
but as one that varies endogenously in response to entrepreneurial action. While it 
remains true that, just as with the quantity theory of money, the direction of 
causality runs from bank money to prices, changes in the former originate in 
entrepreneurial demand for credit required to finance innovations. Moreover, in 
the upswing inflation (through changes in relative prices) also plays a part in 
changing the distribution of productive resources and of income: The 
Schumpeterian inflationary process results in a transfer of productive resources 
and a squeeze of ‘mature’ producers’ purchasing power. 
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Schumpeter's analysis thus implies a drastic break with the quantity theory of 
money. In contrast to traditional monetary theory, he strongly emphasises that 
there is no dichotomy between ‘real’ and ‘monetary’ analysis and no neutrality of 
the money supply in the long-run. In Schumpeters own words,  
 
‘(i)t cannot be argued that the effect is temporary and as such negligible [... ] 
A monetary process, the creation of money which is only a ‘claim ticket’ 
and not also a ‘receipt voucher‘, and the rise in prices to which it leads, 
become a powerful lever of economic development [...] It is the specifically 
capitalistic method of effecting economic progress.’ 
 (Schumpeter 1917: 205-208). 
 
Keynes' analysis of banking, developed both prior to and following the publication 
of the General Theory, is similar to Schumpeter’s in several respects. In the 
Treatise of Money, Keynes maintained that money takes the form of credit money, 
and he shared the idea that bank money - i.e. deposits - is created in the form of 
loans and is not first collected from already existing deposits. In the introductory 
pages to the Treatise, he stresses over and again that banking consists in the 
creation, and not the transfer, of liquidity (Keynes 1930: 25). Secondly, Keynes 
argues on several occasions that the money supply is not exogenously fixed (e.g. 
Keynes 1930: 189). In book 4 of the Treatise, he specifies the reasons why, in his 
view, the supply of bank money should be regarded as endogenous, emphasizing, 
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in particular, that an increase in the volume of global output requires substantial 
changes in the monetary sphere, that is, it ‘requires the acquiescence of the 
banking authorities’ (Keynes 1930: 256). This thought is forcefully taken up again 
in his analysis of the credit cycle which he concluded thus: 
 
‘In countries (such as most of the continent of Europe) where the volume 
of money partly depends on the volume of suitable bills available to be 
discounted at the central bank, an increase in the volume of output has a 
direct tendency to produce some corresponding increase in the volume of 
circulating money.’ 
(ibid: 275 fn). 
The same ideas are developed in a series of articles published between 1937 and 
1939 (Keynes 1937a, 1937b, 1938, 1939) when Keynes was defending his theory 
of the determination of income  against criticisms by Ohlin and Robertson6. In 
these articles, he insists both on the central role of bank in the financing of 
economic activity and on the endogenous nature of bank money: ‘The finance [of 
enterprises] [...] is mainly supplied by specialists, in particular by the banks.' 
(Keynes 1937b:219). 
 
In the course of the debate, Keynes slightly modified his position to the effect that, 
like Schumpeter, he now highlights the possibility of a twofold origin of finance, 
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arguing that the demand for finance can be met in either of two ways: a) through 
banks creating new liquidity or b) through financial intermediaries bringing about 
an increase in the rate of interest and succeeding in making already existing 
liquidity available to enterprises.7 
 
To sum up, in this first section we have highlighted a number of important 
similarities in Keynes’ and Schumpeter’s analyses. In particular, it was argued that 
both authors reject the dichotomy between a real and a monetary sector. They also 
agree that credit money created by banks plays a crucial role in the financing of 
economic activity. However, as Schumpeter himself pointed out, ‘(t)he reader 
should be on his guard against [...] surface similarities’ (Schumpeter 1939: 127) 
between Keynes’ theory and his own. Paying heed to this warning, the next 
section focuses on other aspects of the relation between finance and production. 
 
Interest rates, banking and economic activity 
The argument of this section is concerned with Keynes’ and Schumpeter’s 
analyses of the role played by specific financial tools and institutions in financing 
economic activity. As we shall see, it is here where the two authors differ 
considerably. 
 
Short-term and long-term rates of interest  
Keynes and Schumpeter coincide in their treatment of the rate of interest as a 
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monetary phenomenon. In chapter 17 of the General Theory, the liquidity 
preference theory - stating that the marginal efficiency of money is the premium to 
be paid for parting with money - effectively ensures that the rate of interest is 
determined in the money market: In Keynes’ analysis the rate of interest is the 
price of liquidity. 
 
The same monetary explanation of the rate of interest is also present in 
Schumpeter's approach who argues that ‘interest attaches to money and not to 
goods’ (Schumpeter 1934: 158). Indeed, Schumpeter points out that if  
 
‘money [was] only an intermediate link, merely of technical importance, 
and [we] set about substituting for it the goods which are obtained with it 
and for which therefore in the last analysis interest is paid, we at once lose 
the ground from under our feet ... it is impossible to pierce the money veil in 
order to get to the premiums on concrete goods. If one penetrates through it 
one penetrates into a void’. 
(Ibid: 184).  
 
In a nutshell, ‘the money form [of interest] is not shell but kernel’ (Ibid.). Even so, 
the reason why, according to Schumpeter, the rate of interest is not a real but a 
monetary phenomenon differs from the explanation provided by Keynes. For 
Schumpeter, the monetary nature of interest derives from the fact that the rate of 
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interest is a portion of, a ‘tax,’ on monetary profits. However, the main difference 
between Keynes and Schumpeter’s perception of the rate of interest lies 
elsewhere. To see this, a broader comparison between Schumpeter’s work and 
Keynes’ analysis in the General Theory is called for. 
 
To begin with, recall the main assumptions and conclusions of the General 
Theory regarding the status of money, financial markets and interest rates. As 
seen, money is essentially thought of as a store of value. While this interpretation 
is necessary to refute Say’s law and to demonstrate the possibility of permanent 
unemployment, it also has further consequences for the analysis. In the first place, 
the concept of money as a pure financial asset - as ‘fund-money’ (Arena 1982: 
434) - tends to be overemphasised at the expense of the role of ‘circulatory’ 
money (Arena 1985). Consequently, money as a store of value tends to overlook, 
even though not necessarily to exclude, what Robertson (1966: 161) called the 
forgotten but simple truth that people often acquire money not in order to hold it 
but in order to use it. Moreover, in the General Theory Keynes assumes an 
exogenous money supply8. Remarks such as ‘the quantity of money as determined 
by the action of the central bank’ (Keynes 1936: 247) or ‘the quantity of money 
created by the monetary authority’ (Ibid: 205, see also Ibid.: 84, 167, 174, 230, 
267) can be found throughout the text. This was explicitly noted by Schumpeter 
who argues that, in the General Theory, Keynes assumes that ‘the quantity of 
means of payment [is] externally given, i.e. [is] freely malleable by governments 
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and central banks’ (Schumpeter 1954:1176), whereas, in his earlier writings dating 
from the twenties, ‘he actually only accepted the equation of exchange’ (Ibid: 
1102), i.e. ‘a formal relation [between money, velocity, price level and the volume 
of transactions] without any causal connotation’ (Ibid.: 1096). 
 
Another central feature of the General Theory is that financial markets receive star 
billing. Keynes gives two reasons for this: First, in chapters 13 to 15 he argues that 
the cost of borrowed funds is an important determinant of investment. Second, in 
chapters 12 and 22 we find the argument that financial markets will inevitably be 
affected by waves of shareholder optimism or pessimism which will influence 
entrepreneurs' calculations of the marginal efficiency of capital and may, 
ultimately, even dictate their investment strategy. 
 
Furthermore, as will be seen below, Keynes' analysis of the determination of 
short- and long-term rates of interest and their effect on investment decisions 
differs drastically from Schumpeter's. Even before 1936, Keynes was already 
convinced that the short-term rate of interest was little significance as a 
determinant of investment. Thus, in his correspondance with Hawtrey in 1935, 
Keynes pointed to the minor importance of short term interest charges as a share 
of total cost, arguing that therefore they were a matter of little concern for 
decision.making in business. Even though the argument put forward is different, 
he confirmed this point of view in the General Theory. 
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‘The short term rate of interest is easily controlled by the monetary 
authority, both because it is not difficult to produce a conviction that its 
policy will not greatly change in the very near future, and also because the 
possible loss is small compared with the running yield (unless it is 
approaching vanishing point).’ 
(Keynes 1936: 202-203). 
 
Therefore, what matters is the long-term rate of interest which is not always easily 
controlled by the monetary authorities. The most obvious and sudden variations in 
the long term rate are not caused by changes in the money supply, but are instead 
linked to changes in the liquidity preference function. 
 
Schumpeter's approach strongly contrasts with this view of the workings of 
financial markets. Above all, Schumpeter is not at all convinced that financial 
markets have a decisive role to play in the provision of credit for economic 
activity. For Schumpeter, the  ‘money market’ consists of two distinct spheres : 
the ‘sphere of hoards and reserves’ and the ‘sphere of capital’ or ‘income yielding 
assets’ (Schumpeter 1917: 176), where the latter includes the stock market. 
However, this distinction is of secondary importance to Schumpeter who holds 
that both markets are essentially interdependent.9 He argues, in particular, that the 
workings of financial markets are subordinate to those of ‘the sphere of hoards 
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and reserves’ and, therefore, to the choices of the banking system. In 
Schumpeter’s view, the usual dichotomy between short-term loans and long-term 
assets is, hence, inadequate. Instead, he maintains that capitalist development 
inherently tends to create the conditions for a ‘perfect negotiability of all 
instruments of credit. Whatever their legal form may be’ (Schumpeter 1939: 614). 
Therefore, bonds and shares differ from short-term instruments only ‘technically 
and by degree’ (Ibid), because financial speculation implies a withdrawal of 
existing balances or relies on credit creation. Credit and finance, banks and 
financial markets and, hence, short- and long-term rates of interest are intrinsically 
linked to one another, with long rates really representing a ‘trend value’ of short 
rates.  
 
In this framework, the role of long-term rates is hugly more important than that of 
short-term rates, the main reason being that entrepreneurs' real profits do not so 
much depend on the rate of interest paid on bonds but on interest paid to the 
banking system. In Schumpeter's view, income is divided into wages, bank 
interests and profits. Thus, interest payments made to banks involve a transfer of 
real wealth from the industrial to the financial sector. Whenever interest is paid to 
banks, real output is divided into real wages, industrial profits and financial 
profits. As Graziani (1989: 27) points out, ‘a financial capital is thus gradually 
built up by banks, along with an industrial capital built up by firms’. This 
reinforces an essential point made by Schumpeter, to wit the fact that interest paid 
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to the banking system is a ‘tax’ on profits and, consequently, a brake on 
development. Finally, in the Schumpeterian framework, banks are the main 
financial institutions, which is why they are at the centre of much of Schumpeter’s 
focus and interest. 
 
The role of banks 
While Schumpeter was writing his 1910 article ‘On the nature of economic 
crises’, followed in 1911 by his Theory of Economic Development, Keynes was 
preoccupied with the unsatisfactory state of monetary theory in Britain, which, in 
his judgement, was reduced to a ‘matter of oral tradition’ (Keynes 1983: 375). 
Anglo-Saxon thought on the theory of bank credit has indeed fallen somewhat 
behind developments in Contintental Europe. The view of banks as creators of 
money, inherited from MacLeod (1855), had lost ground in academic circles, 
though retaining some popularity in banking circles.10 MacLeod’s theory of bank 
credit had been violently attacked by Cannan, who had instead proposed his 
famous ‘cloak-room theory of banking activity’ (Cannan 1921) which held that no 
single bank, nor the banking system as a whole, could ever lend more money than 
the deposits it had collected. Cannan's view, according to which banks collect 
savings and then use them in order to finance investment, had become the official 
doctrine which Keynes had to confront, and would ultimately discard with, in his 
Treatise. 
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Not surprisingly then, his main goal in the Treatise is to show that credit granted 
by banks is not limited by savings, or deposits, already in existence. (That is, 
banks can ‘create’ deposits). Nonetheless, Keynes still felt it necessary to specify 
the constraints under which banks operate and which they have to respect. It is for 
this reason that he distinguishes several cases. 11 First, there is the case of ‘pure 
credit’ granted by a single bank: The creation of deposits by the bank determines 
the means of payment deposited with the banking system, not vice versa. 
Moreover, the single bank experiences no limits to this creation of 
deposits.Second, in the case where there are several banks the creation of finance 
by banks is governed by the average behaviour of the banking system. Finally, in  
a ‘mixed-money’ system banks as a whole are constrained by reserve 
requirements which depend on the monetary policy of the issuing bank. 
 
One problem with this approach is that it fails to specify the analytical 
determinants of banks' behaviour and of the setting of interest rates. In the 
theoretical part of the Treatise, Keynes appears to reduce banks’ behaviour to the 
monetary policy pursued by the issuing bank. 12 Variations in the bank interest 
rate are governed by changes either in legal reserves or in the discount rate. 13 In 
so doing, Keynes makes the interest rate, and thus, the determinants of banks’ 
behaviour, exogenous. 
 
Schumpeter’s approach is free of such inadequacies. Like Keynes, he shows that 
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banks are bound by norms of and limits to credit supply. Twenty years before the 
publication of the Treatise, Schumpeter concludes that these limits are determined 
by the average behaviour of banks as a whole. However, contrary to Keynes, he 
downplays the role of the issuing bank, assuming instead that  
 
‘we have a banking system grouped around a central issuing bank, but that 
there are no other legal barriers and rules for the gestation of banking 
business [ ...] This represents the leading case the treatment of which is 
easily applicable to other cases.’ 
(Schumpeter 1911: 112-113).  
 
Other than in the Treatise, on this assumption it is impossible to resort to reserve 
requirements as the main determinant of the credit supply. 
 
Consequently, Schumpeter needs to specify the endogenous determinants of the 
credit supply curve and of the interest rate. His starting point is a closer 
examination of each bank's supply behaviour. According to Schumpeter, each 
bank is faced with the risk of financial loss since it can only succeed in meeting 
financial requests if its customers settle their debts. In order to monitor this risk, 
each bank has to evalute the economic projects or activities to be financed against 
the limits to supply set by the average behaviour of banks as a whole. Risk 
management then implies that there are two determinants of bank behaviour in 
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Schumpeter’s framework: the quality and the total amount of commitments. Each 
bank faces two types of risk: the total risk of bankruptcy related to the financing of 
innovative as opposed to imitative activities 14; and the relative risk of bankruptcy 
for those banks adopting a more accommodating credit policy than the average 
bank. 
 
Schumpeter is thus in a position to define the rules required for securing banking 
activity. The crucial point is ‘neither the formal character of the business to be 
transacted [ ... ] nor the security that makes sound banking, but knowledge and 
understanding of, and proper attention to, the purpose which the balances applied 
for are to serve.’ (Schumpeter 1939: 641). According to Schumpeter, these rules 
consist of ‘judging the chances of success of each purpose and, as a mean to this 
end, the kind of man the borrower is, watching him as he proceeds [ ... ]’ (Ibid). 
This then is the basis on which banks determine the amount and the composition 
of a loan as well as the rate of interest at which it is granted. Hence, the supply of 
credit presupposes an entrepreneurial demand for balances. The credit requested 
will be granted if the bank thinks it proper to meet this demand at terms 
compatible with the potential debtor’s economic targets which are, in turn, a 
function of the latter’s profit expectations. 
 
We can, thus, conclude that the Schumpeterian credit market is characterized by a 
negative relationship between credit demand and interest rate, on the one hand, 
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and by a positive relationship between credit supply and interest rate, on the other. 
The shape of the credit demand curve is determined by the fact that the rate of 
interest is a ‘tax’ on profits. The relationship between the rate of interest and the 
credit supply is positive because of the greater risk accepted by banks who extend 
their credit facilities to those potential entrepreneurs who have been out-selected at 
lower levels of the rate of interest, and because of the likely depreciation of capital 
through inflation. The equilibrium level of the interest rate is established on the 
basis of these two curves. (Schumpeter 1911: 191-198). That is, the interest rate 
fixed by each bank must be equal to the rate of risk assigned to the ‘marginal’ 
debtor (Ibid: 195-196). Likewise, at the aggregate level, the equilibrium level of 
interest must equalise the profit rate expected by the ‘marginal’ entrepreneur or 
imitator whose demand for finance has been met with the rate of interest at which 
the ‘marginal’ bank has actually granted the last credit.15. 
 
However, as we shall see, the complexity of the Schumpeterian analysis makes it 
somewhat difficult to pin down the determininants of credit supply, credit demand 
and the interest rate with more precision. Schumpeter’s own view on the matter is 
aptly summarised in the following passage : 
 
‘There is always, no matter how great the amount of credit in circulation, 
some demand for credit which remains unsatisfied even though it is able to 
pay the current rate of interest. The productive demand for any commodity, 
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e.g. wool, is limited at constant quantity of money, by the falling probability 
of processing continually increasing quantities ; by contrast, demand for 
credit is self-propagating, in that the consequences of its expansion and 
increasing satisfaction go on creating the economic conditions for even 
more credit demand. The more bank money is issued, the more credit is 
necessary for the purchase of one and the same quantity of means of 
production, and the more also, can economically be invested in their 
acquisition. [ ... ]The demand for credit makes possible not only itself, but 
also a corresponding demand, so that supply and demand, in this case do not 
confront each other as independent forces. To this extent, therefore, the 
banks determine not only to whom they will grant credit but also how much 
credit as a whole they wish to grant and what demand to call forth.’ 
(Schumpeter 1917: 207). 
 
On the one hand, the above passage contains important hints about the roles 
played respectively by entrepreneurs and bankers in the process of determining the 
volume of credit. 16 It demonstrates that the volume of credit is a function of the 
interaction between both agents. Firms take the initiative, but banks have the 
power to select among these initatives, based on their expectations as to the 
likelihood of borrowed funds being repaid: ‘We know already by what forces this 
supply is regulated: first with regard to possible failures by entrepreneurs, and 
secondly with regard to the possible depreciation of the credit means of payment’ 
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(Schumpeter 1917: 195). 
 
On the other hand, however,this passage also highlights the limitations of 
Schumpeter's analysis of the workings of the money market. In the first place, 
even when examining the ways in which the credit market operates from within 
his own framwork, Schumpeter fails to offer exact conclusions, the main reason 
being that credit supply and credit demand are mutually interdependent. 
Schumpeter’s reasoning suggests that the higher the demand for credit, the more 
important its supply. However, an increase in credit will be inflationary, 
consequently raising the entrepreneurs’ demand for the quantity of credit money 
required to finance the same quantity of means of production, implying an 
increase in the demand for credit. Therefore, an ‘uncertain value’ adheres to the 
concepts of credit demand and supply due to the permanent instability involved. In 
other words, equilibrium levels of credit and of the interest rate cannot be 
accurately determined. Secondly, Schumpeter’s description of the money market 
is not very useful for an analysis of the process of credit creation. Cyclical shifts of 
the demand for finance affect not only actual but also potential credit levels (i.e. 
the maximum credit banks can create in a given institutional context). Moreover, 
even in a monetary system where banking operations are apparently constrained 
by reserve requirements, credit demand does not meet with any technical supply 
limits. As pointed out in the above passage 17, the reason is to do with the nature 
of credit rationing by banks (that is, the credit volume actually supplied by banks 
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is always lower than the potential volume, so that the former is in elastic supply). 
Furthermore, economic development will push potential credit in the same 
direction (In periods of prosperity, banks are likely to reduce their reserve ratio 
and the cash-deposit ratio falls.) 18 In brief, in this model, actual credit supply 
shifts with demand and does not face a definite ‘ceiling’ of potential credit 
because the latter moves procyclically. 
 
It follows that, in the Schumpeterian model, even though banks obviously perform 
an important task in the accumulation process, because ‘purchasing power is the 
vehicle of an essential process’ (Schumpeter 1911: 97), and because without credit 
there will be no innovations and no cycles, banks do not determine economic 
fluctuations. On the one hand, at the onset of an upswing interest is zero and 
cannot be reduced any further. On the other hand, when active innovation is going 
on, a lowering of the interest rate is of little analytical relevance because of the 
shifts in entrepreneurial demand (Schumpeter 1939: 634-638). In Schumpeter’s 
words, this means that ‘the analytical schema presented in this book evidently 
does not belong to the family of monetary theories of business cycles’ 
(Schumpeter 1939: 142). The actual upper ceiling of the upswing is not set by 
credit supply which expands in prosperity. Rather, limits to credit supply are set 
by the prospect of the success of innovations since interest depends on profits, and 
the risk taken is not the enterpreneur's. but the capitalists' (the banker's) 
(Schumpeter 1911: 75-76 ; 1939: 104). 
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Schumpeterian bankers then appear to be both, Stiglitz’ and Weiss’ 19 ‘social 
accountants’, replacing the auction market ruled by the law of supply and demand, 
and the ‘ephors’20.of market economies who assess innovative projects, but do not 
‘think them up’.  
 
Conclusion 
By taking account of the relationship between finance and economic activity, both 
Keynes and Schumpeter are able to develop a true analysis of economic instability 
which assigns a central role to financial factors. However, the nature of economic 
instability clearly differs between the two authors. To use a distinction suggested 
by Vercelli (1984) one could say that the type of instability investigated by 
Schumpeter is ‘physiological’ in the sense that it makes the survival and the 
development of the capitalist system possible, whereas the type of instability 
Keynes is concerned with is ‘pathological’ in the sense that it impedes the 
performance of an individualistic economic order.  
 
This assertion may offer the key to a better understanding of the actual 
development of financial structures from commodity money to sophisticated 
credit instruments in market economies. More specifically, we suggest that 
financial innovations have been introduced whenever the need was felt to increase 
the structural flexibility of the economic system. 21 Unfortunately, the 
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development of financial structures seems to have contributed not only to more 
physiological instability but also to more pathological problems, resulting at times 
in financial crises, inflation, unemployment and generalised economic crises. 22 
Neither Keynes nor Schumpeter paid sufficient attention to this basic ambiguity of 
financial tools and institutions and their evolvement over time. A synthesis of the 
two approaches would perhaps be the most promising route to a more balanced 
and articulated view of the role of money in economic fluctuations. 
 
Moreover, such a synthesis might be of use for the clarification of an important 
empirical issue, namely the nature of the evolution of the role of financial 
institutions in capitalist economies from the time of Schumpeter and Keynes to the 
presence. As is well-known, financial capitalists no longer act as the ‘ephors’ of 
the economy, providing the necessary finance to ensure the growth of capital 
stock. Today's narrowly focused ‘managers of money’ are little concerned with 
the development of capital assets, much less with the going concerns of economic 
and technological progess. Indeed, the great crash of 1929-1933 marked the end of 
this stage of ‘Finance Capitalism’ in which investment bankers dominated 
financial markets. Today, with the advent of ‘Money Managerial Capitalism’ 
(Minsky 1993: 108), financial structures seem much closer to Keynes' 
characterisation of the financial arrangements of advanced capitalism as a 
‘casino’. 
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However, this evolution of financial structures does not render Schumpeter’s 
approach obsolete. By enriching the analysis of monetary production with a 
broader view of the economy as an evolving institutional, Schumpeter implicitly 
completes Keynes’ theory. Indeed, nowhere is market-driven institutional 
evolution (innovation) more apparent than in the financial sphere. As Schumpeter 
himself argued, financial institutions are also entrepreneurial organisations striving 
to innovate in order to generate capital gains (Schumpeter 1951: 222). Hence, the 
rapid changes in the use of monetary and financing tools that have characterised 
the past fifty-five years of successful capitalism could have been easily 
accomodated and understood within the framework provided by Schumpeter 
which, thus, remains a valid theoretical tool for explaining the evolution of today’s 
financially sophisticated economies.  
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Notes 
1
 In the published text of the General Theory, Keynes uses the terms ‘barter economy’ and 
‘monetary economy’. 
2
 Arena (1985), de Boyer (1985). 
3
 See, for instance, Schumpeter (1917). 
4
 Ibid: 14, 17 and 27 ; 1939, vol. II :546 and 1990: XX. 
5
 On this point, see Graziani 1978: 91 and  Messori 1984: 49. 
6
 Robertson (1966) accused Keynes of having neglected the process of the creation of liquidity in 
the General Theory.  
7
 Keynes 1937a: 208. This may attributed the fact that Keynes was intent on modifying the 
approach adopted in the General Theory as little as possible. As will be seen in the next section, the 
stock market there occupies the main position, while the banking system seems to be entirely 
absent. 
8
 Mainly to facilitate the analysis, see Robinson (1971: 81-82). 
9
 A footnote to the Theory of Economic Development, dealing with this problem, lends support to 
this interpretation. Schumpeter argues there that ‘at the most one may with Spiethoff distinguish the 
capital market as the market for long-term purchasing power from the money market as the market 
for loans. But purchasing power is the commodity in each’ (Schumpeter 1911: 124, note 1). For a 
more detailed account, see Arena and Festré (1994). 
10
 See Graziani (1989). 
11
 For a more detailed account see Messori 1986: 131-133. 
12
 See, for instance, Keynes 1930: chapter 17. 
13
 Ibid: chapter 13, § 2. 
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14
 Schumpeter 1911: 75 n. and 137 ; 1939: 104. 
15
 See Messori 1986: 139. 
16For a more detailed account see Arena and Festre (1994). 
17
 See also Schumpeter 1939: 126 and 640-641. 
18
 Schumpeter 1911: 112-115 ; 1939: 121-123 ; 1917: 206-208. This point has been stressed by 
Bellofiore 1985, in particular. 
19Stiglitz and Weiss 1988. 
20
 Schumpeter 1911:74. The ‘ephor’ was a magistrate of Sparta who contained and controlled the 
kings. In Schumpeter's framework it is the banking system of a capitalist economy which controls 
the finance of economic activites and only those activities which are financed enter the realm of the 
possible. 
21
 As suggested by Schumpeter himself, see 1939: 122. 
22
 In this we follow the ‘Minskyan’ interpretation of the General Theory (Minsky 1975). 
